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ABSTRACT 
The general objective of this paper is to examine what the main determinants are of the 
submission of SPS notifications from Latin American countries to the World Trade 
Organization. For this, a logistic regression was estimated where the dependent variable 
was the number of SPS measures informed during the period 1995-2012 by twenty Latin 
American WTO members, while the explanatory variables were related to the country’s: i) 
trade policy, ii) external sector, iii) macroeconomics, iv) legal capacities, v) health 
concerns, vi) agricultural production and vii) scientific capacities. The results obtained 
evidence that legal and scientific capacities are major factors in what concerns the number 
of notifications presented by Latin American countries. On the other hand, it seems difficult 
to support the idea that local producer pressure is a dominant influence in this case.  
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Introduction 
International trade regulation has been recently characterized by an increase in the visibility 
of non-tariff measures (Hoekman & Nicita, 2008; Nicita & Gourdon, 2013; Santana & 
Jackson, 2012). Some of these measures are enforced to have an impact on the quality of 
traded products (WTO, 2012). The example studied here is the case of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS), which aim to protect food safety, animal and plant health.  
In order to rationalize the impact of SPS on import/export flows, the WTO fostered the 
signing of an international agreement on SPS, as a result of the Uruguay Round. The main 
objective of this agreement is to ensure that members can adopt and enforce SPS without 
this being used for protectionist purposes. For this, countries shall justify their measures 
through a risk assessment in which they will consider the consequences of the entrance into 
force of the SPS, also allowing for reflection on adequate stringency levels.  
Additionally, the SPS Agreement encourages countries to use (if possible) international 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, rather than imposing their own, and to recognize as 
equal the measures of other members, in an attempt to stimulate legal homogeneity and 
compatibility. Another principle within the SPS Agreement is transparency, according to 
which members shall notify the initiation of (or changes to) SPS measures. This obligation 
aims, inter alia, to allow other countries to present comments and amendments to measures 
before they enter into force, in an attempt to reduce possible future disputes.  
However, it is not only WTO regulation that addresses sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. Many recent trade agreements also include a chapter dedicated to SPS. In most 
cases it reinforces the different parts’ commitment to the WTO SPS Agreement, but in 
some cases it also promotes for example institutional joint cooperation in this regard. The 
very recently signed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) establishes its own Dispute Settlement 
body to which parts can appeal for disputes that involve scientific or technical issues. 
The growing importance of SPS measures has led to the development of a significant 
amount of research focused on using econometric models to estimate their effects on 
international trade flows, especially for agrifood products (Boza, 2013). Much of this 
research concludes that SPS measures constrain international trade, even when respecting 
the SPS Agreement that was not the intention (e.g. Beghin & Melatos, 2012; Disdier & 
Marette, 2010; Disdier & Fontagné, 2010; Hoekman & Nicita, 2008; Penello, 2014). 
However, some authors suggest that SPS measures may actually constitute a stimulus for 
exports for those producers who are able to meet requirements (e.g. Crivelli & Gröschl, 
2012; Ferro, Otsuki & Wilson, 2015; Song & Chen, 2010; Wilson & Bray, 2010).  
However, there is very scarce research on the determinants of the different countries’ SPS 
regulatory paths and their use of World Trade Organization mechanisms for safeguarding 
their trade interests. In this sense, the WTO (2012) states that the mitigation of market 
failures such as externalities or information asymmetries may bring about not only the 
raising of a non-tariff measure, but also other intentions such as the manipulation of terms 
of trade, profit shifting to the national industry and the protection of pressure groups.  
On the same topic, Aisbett and Pearson (2012) showed, after applying an econometric 
model, that lower tariff levels negotiated by a country are related to the raising of additional 
SPS measures. However, in this sense, we suggest that the relationship mentioned can 
respond, rather than to a causal link, to the coincidence of the reduction of tariffs and the 
proliferation of non-tariff measures, as processes generalized in the international trade 
framework. Additionally, environment associated variables, such as regulation stringency 
or governance level, were also evidenced by Aisbett and Pearson (2012) as being 
significant. These results differ from those obtained by Besedina and Coupe (2015) in the 
case of Russia, where the most significant factor for SPS notifications is political pressure 
from stakeholders. Meanwhile, after reviewing the evolution of SPS notifications, Boza and 
Fernandez (in press) propose the existence of a link with a country’s level of development, 
as high income countries are much more participative than the others.  
Finally, Ghodsi (2014) emphasized the importance of the country’s scientific level in 
relation to technical barriers to trade (TBT). This kind of measure also belongs to the 
category of technical non-tariff measures, but differs from sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures in terms of the diversity of the objectives addressed, among other factors, 
including not only safeguarding health, but also quality assurance, protection of the 
environment and national security, as well as the prevention of deceptive practices. The 
number of TBTs informed has increased dramatically in recent years, surpassing twenty 
five thousand by the end of 2015 and the number of concerns presented before the TBT 
Committee reaching five hundred. In this last instance, the relative participation of high 
income countries has been particularly marked (Boza & Fernandez, 2014; 2015). 
The aim of this paper is to examine what the main determinants are for the submission of 
SPS notifications to the WTO for Latin American countries. The success of this research 
will contribute significantly to existing literature on the link between SPS measures and 
trade, with a special focus on Latin America, where there are still many facets to explore. 
All of this will represent a constructive background for policymakers that could facilitate 
the conception of adaptation strategies in response to the current demanding scenario facing 
the food sector, and will also constitute a framework for further research. 
General background on the role of Latin America in global food trade  
Latin America is one of the regions with the highest participation rate in global food trade. 
In fact, Latin America is the largest net food exporter in the world, and it is predicted to 
hold that position over the next decade (OECD & FAO, 2015).  
More specifically, in accordance with information from the World Bank WITS database for 
2014, 21.29% of the total value of Latin American exports corresponds to food products, 
compared with only 7.16% in the case of imports1 (Graph 1). In fact, all countries in the 
region present largely positive surplus in their agriculture balances of trade, with the 
exception of Panama.  
                                                          
1 Products in chapters 1 to 24 in the Harmonized System and the Latin American countries with information 
available in the World Bank WITS database were considered. 
Figure 1. Participation of agri-food products in import/exports in Latin American countries 
(% of total value, 2014) 
 
Source: Boza, Sánchez & Rozas, in press, based in WITS 
In this context, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, accounted for over 70% of the value of 
regional agricultural exports. For Brazil and Argentina, exported meat (HS-02), oil seeds 
(HS-12), residues from food industries and animal feed (HS-23) represent half of the total 
export value; while in Mexico this is true for edible vegetables and legumes (HS-07), edible 
fruit and nuts (HS-08), beverages, spirits and vinegar (HS-22). 
  
Table 1. Main agri-food exports from Latin American countries in accordance with HS 
chapters (% of total value of agri-food exports, 2014) 
Argentina El Salvador 
HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 35,4 HS17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 24,4 
HS10 Cereals 14,4 HS19 
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; 
pastry cooks' products 13,7 
HS15 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal 
or vegetable waxes. 12,2 HS9 
  
 
Coffee, tea, maté and spices. 10,8 
Bolivia Guatemala 
HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 36,2 HS17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 21,9 
HS15 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal 
or vegetable waxes. 18,8 HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 21,2 
HS10 Cereals 11,2 HS9 Coffee, tea, mate and spices. 19,0 
Brazil Mexico 
HS12 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder. 28,5 HS7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers. 21,8 
HS2 Meat and edible meat offal 18,7 HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 16,9 
HS17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 11,7 HS22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 16,6 
Chile Nicaragua 
HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 49,1 HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 22,6 
HS22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 16,2 HS19 
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; 
pastrycooks' products 19,4 
 HS12 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder. 11,7 
Colombia Panama 
HS9 Coffee, tea, maté and spices. 35,4 HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 38,8 
HS6 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the 
like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage. 19,4 HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 11,9 
HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 12,9  
Dominican Republic Paraguay 
HS24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 26,7 HS12 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder. 38,1 
HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 18,3 HS2 Meat and edible meat offal 21,3 
HS18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 10,2 HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 17,8 
Ecuador Peru 
HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 40,3 HS8 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons. 21,2 
HS16 
Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, 
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates. 18,7 HS23 
Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 21,0 
HS6 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the 
like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage. 11,9 HS9 Coffee, tea, maté and spices. 11,8 
 
Uruguay 
HS2 Meat and edible meat offal 27,8 
HS12 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder. 27,0 
HS10 Cereals 14,4 
Source: Adapted from Boza, Sánchez & Rozas, in press, based in WITS 
In relation to imports, according to WITS data for 2014, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina concentrate more than 75% of the region’s total value, but with relevant 
differences between the countries mentioned. While clearly import values are much lower 
than export values, they are relevant for this research given their relationship with the 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures established by Latin American WTO members. 
For Mexico, meat (HS-02), cereals (HS-10), oil seeds (HS-12), dairy products (HS-04) and 
residues from food industries and animal feed (HS-23) represent more than half of the total 
value of food imports. In the case of Brazil, food imports are concentrated for cereals (HS-
10), animal and vegetable fats (HS-15), edible fruits and nuts (HS-08), beverages, spirits 
and vinegars (HS-22) and milling industry products (HS-11). In Chile, imported meat (HS-
02), cereals (HS-10) and residues from food industries and animal feed (HS-23) are very 
significant; while in Argentina this is true for edible fruits and nuts (HS-08), miscellanea of 
edible preparations (HS-21), unprocessed cocoa and cocoa preparations (HS-18). 
More than 30% of said imports come from other countries in the region, while the leading 
destination markets for Latin American food products are the United States, the European 
Union and, increasingly, China. In this sense, Asia is a net importer of basic food products, 
the same as Africa; trends that are expected to continue in the coming years and which 
represent a major commercial opportunity for Latin America (FAO, 2015). 
In general terms, intra-regional trade have a complementary role in satisfying the domestic 
demand for food in Latin American countries. With regard to intra-regional trade, various 
studies show that food exporters consider the most stringent technical requirements to be 
those imposed by trade partners within the region (World Bank, 2008; Mimouni, Averbeck 
& Skorobogatova, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010). Consequently, SPS measures imposed by Latin 
American countries seem to especially affect the region’s internal food trade. 
  
Involvement of Latin American countries in WTO-SPS mechanisms 
i) Notifications 
From 1995 to 2012, a total of 14,864 SPS envisaged measures were informed to the WTO 
Secretariat. Of these, 3,489 were presented by the United States, being the most active 
“notifier” in this regard. Eight Latin American countries, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, 
Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica and El Salvador, were among the twenty members of the 
WTO with the highest number of notifications in the indicated period.  
Figure 2. Participation of Latin American WTO members in regional SPS notifications (% 
of total amount, 1995-2012) 
 
Source: Compilation based on WTO SPS-IMS database 
In fact, the eight Latin American countries already mentioned concentrate 85.6% of the 
3,898 regional SPS notifications between 1995 and 2012. The most prominent case is that 
of Brazil, third worldwide only after the US and Canada with 1,132 notifications. In this 
regard, a study by Da Almeida, Monteiro da Silva and De Lima (2010) concluded that the 
growth of the Brazilian economy has been the main determinant of the evolution of SPS 
notifications, suggesting the increasingly demanding market requirements as the cause. 
Besides Brazil, other countries with an important participation in regional SPS notifications 
are, in this order: Chile (516), Peru (481), Colombia (405) and Mexico (304). 
Figure 3. Evolution of the number of SPS notifications presented by the five Latin 
American countries with the highest participation (1995-2012) 
 
Source: Compilation based on WTO SPS-IMS database 
ii) Concerns 
As previously mentioned, when members have concerns about the SPS measure raised by 
other members they can express them at the SPS Committee. The different members’ 
participation in said concerns attends to these three categories: concerned, maintaining and 
supporting country, in accordance with their role in the presentation of the STC.  
From 1995 to 2012 a total of 344 STCs were raised, of which 102 were solved. As regards 
concerned countries, the two most important are the United States, with 80 STCs, and the 
European Union, with 71 STCs. They are followed by some middle income countries, 
including Argentina (39) and Brazil (25). On the other hand, as regards maintaining 
countries, the European Union and United States are once again the most present, with 67 
and 40 STCs; in Latin America, Brazil (14) and Mexico (11) stand out. As supporting 
countries of the SPS STCs the European Union and the United States are also the most 
active. However, some Latin American countries such as Argentina (25), Chile (23), Brazil 
(21) and Mexico (17) are also in prominent positions (Boza & Fernandez, in press).   
Figure 4. Participation of Latin American WTO members in STCs (1995-2012) 
 
Source: Compilation based on WTO SPS-IMS database 
iii) Disputes 
As previously mentioned, the SPS Committee is not able to formally settle the matter 
causing an STC, so members’ “concerns” are moved to the WTO Dispute Settlement when 
they strongly believe that another country is not respecting the SPS Agreement.  
From 1995 to 2015, Latin American members of the WTO were complainants in 117 
disputes and respondents in 94. As complainants, Latin American countries invoked the 
SPS Agreement (Table 1) in only 7 cases. Herreros and Garcia-Millan (2015) suggest that 
this low number of SPS cases, despite the importance of agricultural trade for the region, 
may be due to the high technical nature of the argument required to address a dispute of this 
kind. However, this doesn’t seem to be a limitation only for Latin American countries, 
given that from the 501 disputes initiated in the WTO until the end of 2015, only 43 
invoked the SPS Agreement. Besides, in those cases high income members, such as the 
United States and the European Union, had a majority stake as both complainant and 
respondent (Boza & Fernandez, in press). Complementarily, the number of SPS disputes in 
which a Latin American country participates as a respondent is even lower: only two cases.  
For disputes where the TBT Agreement is invoked, for 51 totals between 1995 and 2015, a 
Latin American member was the complainant in 16 cases. Likewise, for a total of 77 
disputes under the Agreement on Agriculture in the same period, in 19 of them a Latin 
American member was the complainant and in 14 it was the respondent.   
Table 2. Participation of Latin American countries as complainant and/or respondent in 
WTO disputes invoking the SPS Agreement (1995-2015) 
Dispute number Year Complainant Respondent Product/Issue 
DS203 2000 US Mexico Live pigs 
DS237 2001 Ecuador Turkey Fresh fruit 
DS284 2003 Nicaragua Mexico Black beans 
DS293 2003 Argentina EC Biotech 
DS386 2008 Mexico US Origin labelling 
DS447 2012 Argentina US Animal products 
DS448 2012 Argentina US Lemons 
DS484 2014 Brazil Indonesia Poultry products 
Source: Compilation based on WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway 
However, some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, Argentina and 
Mexico, have made a significant contribution to SPS disputes as third parties; this means as 
members other than the complainant(s) and respondent that want to monitor and influence 
the proceedings (Busch & Reinhardt, 2006); presumably due to an interest in the case.  
  
Identification of determinants for SPS notifications  
Once described the participation of Latin American countries in WTO SPS mechanisms, 
we will focus on addressing the determinants of the submission of notifications.  
For this, a Poisson regression was estimated, where the dependent variable is the number of 
SPS measures reported by Latin American members2 to the WTO from 1995 to 2012. The 
use of a Poisson model is very common when the dependent variable is a count variable, 
which assumes few nonnegative values, zero included (Wooldridge, 2003)3.  
For the definition of explanatory variables, first analogous studies (already mentioned) 
were considered (Aisbett & Pearson, 2012; Ghodsi, 2014; Besedina & Coupe, 2015); as 
they address the same issue as this research, although for other countries.  
However, as this similar literature is still reduced, research on the determinants of the 
participation of countries in WTO Dispute Settlement was also reviewed (Horn, Mavroidis 
& Wijkström, 1999; Holmes, Rollo & Young, 2003; Besson & Mehdi, 2004; Bown, 2004; 
2005; Fadiga & Fadiga-Stewart, 2005; Guzman & Simmons, 2005; Bohl, 2009; Davis & 
Blodget, 2009; Götz, Heckelei & Rudloff, 2010; Sattler & Bernauer, 2011). Unfortunately 
that research did not distinguish between disputes in accordance with the invoked 
agreement, therefore not giving specific results for those related to SPS measures. 
Given the above, it was decided that the explanatory variables in the model should be 
divided into the following categories: i) trade policy, ii) external sector, iii) 
macroeconomics, iv) legal capacities, v) health concerns, vi) agricultural production and 
vii) scientific capacities. They are specifically defined in the table below. 
  
                                                          
2 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
3 In econometrics, logistic models (such as Tobit) focus on the estimation of the probability of a determined 
response (or value of the dependent variable) in accordance to a set of explanatory variables. They are used 
very commonly when the dependent variable has a restricted number of possible values (limited dependent 
variable). Examples of this are “count variables”, i.e. variables for which observations can only take positive 
integer values. The number of notifications that a country reports to the WTO in a given year corresponds to a 
count variable, as it only takes a limited number of integer values equal or bigger than zero.  
Table 3. Description of explanatory variables in the estimated model 
Variable Data Source 
Agriculture sector contribution Value added (% of GDP) by 
agriculture sector 
World Development Indicators. 
World Bank. 
Relevance of agriculture imports Value of agricultural 
imports/Value of total imports 
World Integrated Trade Solution. 
World Bank. 
Research and Development 
resources 
Research and Development 
expenditure as percentage of GDP 
Red de Indicadores de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (RICYT). 
Tariffs for agriculture imports Weighted average tariff for 
agricultural products 
World Integrated Trade Solution. 
World Bank. 
Legal capacities Regulatory quality index Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. World Bank. 
Health concerns Health expenditure per capita in 
2010 international dollars PPP 
World Development Indicators. 
World Bank. 
 
The outcomes for the estimation of the proposed Poisson model with the variables 
described as explanatory and the number of SPS measures informed by each Latin 
American country as dependent are presented in the following table. 
Table 4. Determinants of notifications from Latin American countries: Poisson Model 
Explanatory variables Parameter 
estimate 
Incidence Rate 
Ratio 
Agriculture sector contribution -0.0939* 
(0.0098) 
0.9103 
(0.0089) 
Relevance of agriculture imports -0.0448* 
(0.0082) 
0.9561 
(0.0079) 
Research and Development resources 2.0899* 
(0.0704) 
8.0845 
(0.5698) 
Tariffs for agriculture imports -0.0204* 
(0.0039) 
0.9797 
(0.0038) 
Legal capacities 0.3078* 
(0.0389) 
1.3604 
(0.053) 
Health concerns 0.000031 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
Constant 2.999 
(0.1612) 
 
Number of observations 152  
LR chi2 2,806.01  
Pseudo R2  0.5031  
Dependent variable: Number of notifications presented in year t by country i. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
The results obtained show that, except health expenditure, all the other variables considered 
are significant. However, there are important differences in the sense and level of impact of 
each variable. For instance, although a priori it seems a counterintuitive outcome, the 
agricultural sector level of participation in the economy is negatively related to the number 
of SPS notifications. This suggests several possible conclusions: i) the “richest countries” 
within the sample, where the relative weight of agricultural production in their economies is 
lower, have greater resources and capacities in order to generate SPS measures, ii) 
differences in participation of the agricultural sector in the economy are also reflected in the 
composition of food imports, which conditions safety concerns and iii) the years when the 
agricultural sector growth slows pressuring the public sector to hinder foreign product 
competition. This last argument seems to be ruled out by the negative relation between the 
relevance of agricultural imports and the number of SPS notifications evidenced by the 
model. Conversely, the first argument seems to have more support in the model estimation. 
Higher legal capacities and, in particular, scientific resources are positively related to the 
number of notifications presented by Latin American countries; and both variables show in 
this specific case a positive correlation with their GDP per capita. 
In fact, if we observe the incidence rate ratio associated to each explanatory variable in the 
model, it is evident that the one with a higher impact in SPS notifications is the country’s 
Research and Development expenditure. A Latin American country with 1% higher R&D 
expenditure to GDP than another will notify eight times more SPS measures. This result is 
coherent with the fact that, according to the SPS Agreement, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures shall rely on scientific evidence that supports a risk assessment analysis. 
On the other hand, considering the results obtained, we previously partially discarded that, 
at least in this case, local producer pressure be a determinant factor for the imposition of 
SPS measures. However, it is worth mentioning that if we look at disputes, for some Latin 
American countries such as Brazil, the participation of local industry is very strong in 
practical terms. Meanwhile, model estimation shows a negative relation between tariff 
levels for agricultural products and the number of SPS notifications. That might suggest, at 
first, some kind of deviation of trade protectionism from tariff to non-tariff instruments. 
Nevertheless, we think there is not enough evidence for the above to be categorically stated, 
as it can respond to the coincidence in time of two generalized processes: reduction of 
tariffs, in many cases from the signing of Trade Agreements, and the proliferation of non-
tariff measures. Such reduction of tariffs has been much more pronounced for the case of 
plant products than for animal products. In any case, the incidence rate ratio associated to 
the tariff level for agriculture, shows a low impact in the number of SPS notifications.   
Concluding remarks 
Food safety concerns are increasingly present in international trade. However, it is little the 
existing evidence about the factors that affect a country’s sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulatory process. This, despite the identification of the previously mentioned factors, 
constitutes very interesting input with which to eventually support corrective actions.  
Considering the above, this article has aimed to address the issue declared for the specific 
case of Latin American countries, identifying the main determinants of the number of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures informed to the WTO Secretariat by each region 
member from the entry into force of the SPS Agreement (1995) to 2012. 
The results obtained evidence that legal and especially scientific resources and capacities 
are major factors in terms of the number of notifications presented by Latin American 
countries. On the other hand, it seems difficult to maintain that pressure from local 
producers for protectionist purposes is a dominant influence, as countries with a higher 
relevance of imported agricultural products have imposed less SPS measures. Additionally, 
though the tariff level appears to have a relation with the number of SPS measures, the 
impact is quite negligible.  
From the point of view of public action, these results suggest that given the importance of 
technical skills for SPS regulatory capabilities, the extension of assistance intensity seems 
an appropriate measure if the objective is to generate higher equity between WTO 
members. However, it is unlikely to think that just strengthening the existing cooperation 
initiatives in the WTO to improve the SPS capacities of developing countries, or replicating 
them at a regional level, is enough to close the gap with high income countries.  
On the other hand, there is a worrying gap in the ability to establish sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, and even more so in the ability to respond to those imposed by 
other countries, both as regards compliance by local producers or, when it is considered 
appropriate, to raise a concern or initiate a dispute. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that one of the main limitations of this article is that the SPS 
measures considered in the model were not disaggregated by the type of product(s) 
involved. This may have enriched the results, since it is likely that the behavior of SPS 
regulations for plant and animal products differ, as does its relation to food safety.  
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